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Abstract
The purpose of this study was to complete a qualitative analysis of the decision-making process used by pilots to determine whether or
not to deploy an airframe parachute system. A sample of participants from the subject university’s flight training program was selected to
complete a scripted simulator flight in instrument flight conditions. During the flight, participants experienced an engine failure while enroute during IFR conditions. The script was examined and validated by an expert panel who determined use of the airframe parachute was
the most appropriate outcome for the scenario. Interestingly, only 9 of the 21 participants responded as expected by the expert panel and
deployed the parachute system; only three of the nine followed the correct deployment procedure as outlined in the Pilot’s Operating
Handbook. Analysis of a post-flight survey completed by participants provides insights into the decision-making process used by pilots
and offers explanations on why or why not participants used the airframe parachute.
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Introduction
When operating single-engine aircraft, pilots traditionally had one possible outcome after an engine-failure: a
controlled glide to a forced landing (a landing that occurs
off-site from an airport). Nonoptimum conditions may have
added to the emergency complexity if the engine failure
occurred over inhospitable terrain, during night hours or
instrument flight conditions. With recent technological
advancements, some aircraft are now equipped with an
airframe parachute system that can be utilized in certain
catastrophic emergencies. This airframe parachute, once
deployed manually by the pilot, provides an alternative
outcome to what otherwise may have been a very risky,
dangerous or even deadly accident. Of interest in the
present study is the decision-making process utilized by
pilots operating an aircraft equipped with an airframe
parachute system.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to complete a qualitative
analysis of the decision-making process used by pilots to
determine whether or not to deploy an airframe parachute
system. Participants completed a scripted flight scenario
that resulted in an emergency engine failure in instrument
flight conditions.
Review of the Literature
A comprehensive literature review was completed as part
of this study. Major theories on decision making were
analyzed to identify those which are most applicable in an
aviation context. Further literature was examined to
understand human factors issues appropriate to decision
making within an aviation context, such as heuristics and
biases.
Naturalistic Decision Making within an Aviation Context
There are a number of interesting theories that address
decision making. However, the two that were isolated for
study in this project were classical decision theory and
naturalistic decision making (Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, &
Salas, 2001). Classical decision theory assumes that options
are clearly known prior to making decisions and is an
overarching term given to normative and prescriptive
decision making (Beach & Lipshitz, 1993). This theory
assumes that there is a right and wrong choice that can be
made, and this may not always be the case in aviation
emergency situations (Lipshitz et al., 2001). The type of
decision making that appears to be best suited and
applicable within an aviation context is naturalistic decision
making (NDM) (Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsambok,
1993). As defined by Lipshitz, et al. (2001), ‘‘NDM is an
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attempt to understand how people make decisions in realworld contexts that are meaningful and familiar to them’’ (p.
332). A key component to NDM is the recognition that
decisions may have to be made without all the facts
available, and this emphasis on real-world situations is very
applicable to the aviation field. ‘‘In many high risk
consequential environments, time for a decision is limited,
information is incomplete, conditions change dynamically,
and goals shift, rendering analytic decision making impractical, if not impossible’’ (Orasanu, 2010, p. 150). Craig
(2000) further references the characteristics of naturalistic
decisions as outlined by Orasanu and Connolly as ‘‘illstructured problems; uncertain dynamic environments;
shifting, ill-defined or competing goals; action/feedback
loops; time stress, high stakes; and multiple players’’
(pp. 22–23). Many, if not all, of these characteristics are
applicable to aviation decisions in critical contexts.
Naturalistic decision-making theory will be applicable to
the current study due to the dynamic and evolving
environment related to aviation decision making. The
subject university has utilized aircraft equipped with an
airframe parachute system for approximately three years at
the time this study was completed. Therefore, it was
assumed that students and instructors will have adapted to
this new safety feature, have been trained, and gained
experience in having this system on-board. Since NDM is
heavily influenced by previous experience, the researchers
were particularily interested in how prior training would
influence participants’ decisions to utilize the airframe
parachute.
The Possible Influences of Heuristics and Biases on
Aviation Decision Making
Decision-making heuristics and biases were reviewed to
determine their possible influence on aviation-related
decision making. Heuristics are often associated with
decision models and are defined as a ‘‘mental ‘shortcut’
involving psychological processes such as assessing the
similarity of one event to another or the ease with which an
example can be brought to mind, rather than reasoning with
probabilities’’ (O’Hare, 2003, p. 204). While heuristics may
shorten the time required to make a decision, it should be
cautioned that these tools sometimes result in the wrong
decision being made. The researchers concluded that
heuristic mental shortcuts might have biased the pilots into
making the incorrect decision; complacency could have
also played a role in the incorrect decision. In another
example, a pilot who is familiar with what a warning light
indicates may, upon seeing it, be prompted to take
corrective action without considering all possibilities the
light may indicate. Typically, this works in favor of the
decision maker because the decision making process is
shortened. This can become an issue, however, when the
decision maker lacks the knowledge or experience to
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recognize the heuristic or if the heuristic does not apply in
that situation. Wickens (2002) and Casner (2010) highlight
the importance of alerts and alarms being correct. If alerts
and alarms frequently sound erroneously, the flight crew
will soon become somewhat immune to the warnings. In a
situation where a true warning or issue is present, the crew
may then be slow to respond.
Bias can also impact pilot decision making. Decision
bias is defined as ways in which pilots may ignore or omit
certain components of the decision making strategy that
prevents them from arriving at the best decision (Vidulich
et al., 2010). Heuristics and bias may work together to
delude the decision maker (or perhaps more appropriately
allow the decision maker to delude himself or herself).
Anchoring heuristics and confirmation bias are closely
related. An anchoring heuristic is the idea that the
information received first will be believed despite newer
information that becomes available (Tversky & Kahneman,
1974). The confirmation bias substantiates this when the
decision maker then seeks information to confirm
the anchoring heuristic (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978). An
example is a VFR pilot’s decision to continue into
deteriorating weather conditions. The original weather
report may have reported clear weather so that information
is stuck in the decision maker’s mind. Despite weather
conditions worsening during the flight, the decision maker
gathers information to encourage the continuation of the
flight. Orasanu (2010) and Casner (2010) term this type of
experience as plan continuation error (PCE).
Framing bias occurs when the pilot is faced with two
negative or unpleasant decisions: a ‘‘sure loss’’ and a ‘‘risky
loss’’ (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Vidulich et al., 2010).
For example, when faced with two negative choices, a
person may be more likely to select the riskier choice
instead of the sure loss, such as continuing flight into
deteriorating weather conditions instead of turning around.
This concept is extremely applicable toward the decision of
using an airframe parachute or any other irreversible
decision in aviation. Framing bias could encourage the pilot
to continue pressing the situation, thereby choosing the
‘‘risky loss’’ (not deploying) instead of the ‘‘sure loss’’
(deploying), which may in fact be the safer choice
(Vidulich et al., 2010). Awareness of this bias could assist
pilots in reducing its impact on decision error.
Prospect theory is the idea that pilots will be risk averse
when they can gain from the decision and risk takers when
there is an apparent loss from the decision (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979). Framing bias is very similar to sunk cost
bias (Vidulich et al., 2010) and related to prospect theory.
In sunk cost bias, pilots who have invested a lot into the
flight (for example, money, time, and distance) will be
more likely to continue. Again this could have a significant
impact on the decision to choose an irreversible option. If
the aircraft would be destroyed by deploying the aircraft’s
parachute system, it would be a significant financial loss for

the pilot. According to sunk cost bias and prospect theory,
the pilot may be more inclined to select the riskier option.
Orasanu (2010) highlights some other issues that can result
in erroneous decisions such as omissions, lack of knowledge, social factors, and personal stress.
Of particular interest in the current study was an
examination of if and how decision-making biases would
influence the deployment decision of an airframe parachute. These biases may be influenced by the type or
training and opinions that surround the decision of how and
when to deploy this safety device.
Research Questions
The current study sought to determine how pilots made
the decision to deploy an airframe parachute system when
encountering an emergency situation. Data were collected
to answer the following research questions:
1. How do pilots recognize or know when to make the
decision to deploy an airframe parachute?
2. What is the accuracy of pilot procedures when
utilizing an airframe parachute?
Methodology and Research Framework
The current study completed a qualitative analysis of
pilot decision making to a scripted flight scenario. The data
were collected to provide insight into how pilots responded
to the emergency situation. These qualitative data were
analyzed to determine how educational components might
have influenced the decision-making process. The study
sought to gain an understanding of the training that
participants received on when to use the airframe
parachute. Participants were asked if they felt they received
adequate training along with open-ended questions to
determine if they could properly identify conditions where
a parachute deployment was the most appropriate scenario.
A qualitative analysis was completed to examine
participant survey responses after completing a scripted
flight scenario. A survey instrument administered to
participants gathered valuable insight into the actions and
reactions of pilots when faced with this scenario.
Qualitative data analysis revealed interesting findings as
participants explained their course of actions during the
scenario.
Participants
The target population for the study was flight students
and part-time flight instructors in the subject university’s
Professional Flight Program. Students in the program
currently complete flight training in Cirrus aircraft, which
are equipped with an airframe parachute system. A
convenience sampling of participants, with at least a
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private pilot certificate and an instrument rating, were
selected to participate in the study.
Twenty-one participants completed the study, and data
reflecting participant background were collected as part of
the study. Information concerning age, total flight hours,
total Cirrus aircraft flight hours, and total flight training
device hours were obtained and a summary of these data
are provided in Table 1 located in the Results section.
Information on pilot certificates and ratings was also
collected. All participants held a commercial pilot certificate. Ten participants were certified flight instructors (CFI)
and one participant held certification to teach in instrument
conditions (CFII).
Instruments
The instruments used in this study consisted of an
Advanced Aircraft Training Device (AATD) that replicated
a Cirrus SR20 aircraft, a scripted flight scenario, and an
electronic survey.
The AATD is a fixed-based, flight-training device that
accurately replicates a Cirrus SR20 aircraft. The device
consists of an aircraft cockpit with full aircraft instrumentation. A 170 ˚ visual display wraps around the outside of the
AATD. Behind the aircraft cockpit is an instructor station.
The instructor station provides control of a number
of aircraft parameters, weather, and aircraft failures.
Photographs of the instructor station and cockpit are shown
in Figure 1.
A script was completed for the experiment to ensure each
participant would receive identical conditions during the
simulated flight. The scenario was a flight from the
Lafayette (KLAF) airport to the Quad Cities (KMLI)
airport. The suggested cruise altitude was 4,000 ft. MSL.
The weather for the scenario was instrument conditions
with visibility set at 2 miles and cloud ceilings at 400 feet
above ground level (AGL). The flight scenario and script
were validated by an expert panel that consisted of
designated pilot examiners from the subject university
and training managers and supervisors from the aircraft
manufacturer’s training and standards department. The
expert panel determined unanimously that the most
appropriate outcome to the scenario was an airframe
parachute deployment. Prior to beginning the scenario,
study participants received a pre-flight planning packet.
This packet included a standard weather briefing, en-route
and approach charts, and a completed flight plan form.
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Participants received approximately 15 minutes to familiarize themselves with the materials, and participants were
only allowed to use supplies provided by the researchers.
Participants began the scenario located on the parking
ramp.
The survey instrument was developed by the researchers
to gather qualitative data on participant experience during
the scenario. The survey sought information on how well
participants felt they had been trained on the airframe
parachute system, reactions to their performance during the
scenario, and to explain their decision on whether or not they
utilized the airframe parachute system. A Cronbach’s
alpha analysis of the survey instrument indicated a strong
reliability coefficient with a reported alpha level of 0.78
(Field, 2009). This value indicates that participants provided
similar answers to similar survey questions and were
consistent in their answering of the survey. The survey
was administered electronically approximately two weeks
after the flight scenario, and all participants who completed
the flight scenario also completed the electronic survey.
Procedure
Participants for the study were solicited via e-mail and
classroom announcements at the subject university. In order
to participate in the study, a minimum of a private pilot
certificate with instrument rating was required. Participants
were scheduled to complete the simulator scenario, which
took approximately 30 minutes to complete. Simulator
scenarios sessions were scheduled and all sessions were
completed over a 5-day period. When participants arrived,
a research assistant provided the flight-briefing packet and
participants were given approximately fifteen minutes to
review the pre-flight information. Participants were then
escorted into the AATD where the flight scenario began.
Participants were instructed to complete the flight and
respond to all situations as they would in a real aircraft. The
researcher solely acted as a simulator operator and air
traffic control, which was read directly from the flight
script. The simulator sessions were video recorded for
review during the data analysis process. After completion
of the scenario, participants were excused, received $10
USD compensation, and within two weeks e-mailed the
post hoc electronic survey to reflect on their experience.
Administering the survey two weeks after the scenario
allowed participants time to reflect on their decisions.
Results

Table 1
Summary of participant demographic information.

Age
Total Hours
Cirrus Hours
FTD Hours

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

21
21
21
21

20.95
323.06
204.95
58.00

1.161
153.37
96.38
18.12

20
211.00
51.80
5.20

25
750.40
478.00
100.00

A summary of participant demographic is provided in
Table 1.
Only nine out of the 21 participants deployed the
parachute. This finding was not in agreement with the
expert panel that validated the scenario and determined a
parachute deployment to be the most appropriate scenario
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Figure 1. Instructor station (left) and the Cirrus SR20 AATD.

outcome. Of the nine participants that did deploy, only
three followed the correct deployment procedure as
outlined in the aircraft Pilot’s Operating Handbook
(POH). A survey was used to determine why or why not
participants decided to use the airframe parachute system,
and all 21 participants completed the survey. Participants
were asked their agreement or disagreement with the
statement that if they were to fly the scenario again, they
would react the same way. The majority of students, 52%
agreed or strongly agreed with this statement; however,
38% disagreed, and 10% neither agreed nor disagreed.
The participants who deployed the parachute were asked
an open-ended question to explain their decision; nine
participants responded to this question. Three participants
identified that they were trained to deploy the parachute if
the engine failed in instrument meteorological conditions.
Participants referenced the low ceiling of the clouds and the
inability to glide to the nearest airport. Some identified a
‘‘decision altitude’’ that if they descended to and were
unable to restart the engine or be in visual conditions, they
deployed the parachute. These views tended to be in
agreement with scenarios the expert panel determined to be
appropriate parachute deployment situations.
Participants who did not deploy the parachute were
asked to explain why that decision was made; 12
participants responded to this question. Answers as to
why the parachute was not deployed tended to fall in one of
four groupings.
Category 1: Deployment Did Not Apply to Scenario
Two participants said that a parachute deployment did not
apply in this situation. One participant said: ‘‘there are
defined situations when to use the CAPS and this was not
one of them.’’ This response was contradictory to statements
made by participants from the group that did deploy and
cited their reasoning as being standard operating procedure
at the subject university. An obvious concern related to this
response from participants was the lack of recognition of
CAPS usage. The expert panel members indicated that
CAPS was the appropriate outcome in this scenario;
therefore, it is interesting that a few participants did not feel
this was an appropriate time to use the airframe parachute.

Category 2: Concern for Aircraft Damage
A second concern expressed by participants who did not
deploy the parachute was the risk of damage to the aircraft.
Three individuals expressed this concern. These participants determined it was more beneficial to complete a
forced landing because they felt that less damage would
occur to the aircraft. However, one participant who stated
this also recognized the increased risk: ‘‘although it was
risky not to deploy [the parachute] with a sure thing I felt it
was still a good decision to continue a forced landing.’’ The
concern for damage was also closely linked with the
concern of aircraft control. Participants stated that they felt
they would be able to land the aircraft in a field and cause
less damage to the aircraft than if they had used the
parachute system. An interesting view from these participants was the great concern for aircraft damage. While it is
possible that if a forced landing was successful, there may
be less damage to the aircraft than if the parachute was
deployed, there is also greater risk from a forced landing
that impact forces could be more harmful to the aircraft’s
occupants.
Category 3: Desire for Aircraft Control or Delayed
Decision Too Long
Four participants expressed the decision to continue with
a forced landing instead of using the parachute because it
would allow them control of the aircraft all the way to the
ground. ‘‘I was in a flat area where I could control myself to
a safe landing’’ said one respondent. Some participants felt
that they had waited too long to consider the parachute or
they were too low to have adequate time to utilize it. Two
interesting points raised by participants are controlling the
aircraft and waiting too long to decide to use CAPS. Since
many aircraft do not have an airframe parachute, pilots
have no option except to complete a glide to a forced
landing. Having an airframe parachute on-board may
change the mentality of flying the aircraft. It is possible
that participants are expressing a lack of wanting to resign
to using the parachute and instead feel more in control by
maintaining a glide to a forced landing. Additionally, if
participants wait too long to decide to deploy the parachute,
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there may not be enough altitude remaining to then deploy
it. This highlights the balance in assessing the situation,
making the necessary decision, and committing to either a
forced landing or parachute deployment.
Category 4: Forgot or Did Not Feel Trained
A final area that was noted by three participants was that
they either forgot or had not been trained on when to use
the parachute. ‘‘While I have flown (subject university)
SR20s in real life and have some time in the AATD, I have
never received any formal training in the SR-20 AATD and
have never used the CAPS simulator in an appropriate
scenario,’’ explained one respondent. Other participants felt
like they thought of it too late in the emergency and had
lost too much altitude to deploy the parachute safely. This
response is perhaps the most concerning. Adding any safety
feature to an aircraft is only valuable if operators are willing
to use it. Having a parachute system installed but forgetting
about it would be similar to having seatbelts installed, but
forgetting to fasten them before flight.
Participant Views of Deployment Scenarios
All participants were asked to describe the conditions
under which they would consider deploying the airframe
parachute in an open-ended question. Participants were able
to identify multiple situations in which they felt a parachute
deployment would be the most appropriate decision. Since
the question was administered as an internet-based survey,
it is unclear if participants responded to this question from
memory or if external sources were used to provide
assistance in identifying likely parachute deployment
scenarios. When participants were asked if they felt they
had received adequate training on when to and when not to
use the parachute, 24% disagreed, and 71% either agreed or
strongly agreed with this statement. One respondent neither
agreed nor disagreed with that statement.
Discussion of Findings
Study findings may be the result of, or influenced by,
framing bias (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Framing bias
occurs when a pilot has to choose between a ‘‘sure loss’’
and a ‘‘risky loss.’’ When making an irreversible decision,
such as to deploy an airframe parachute, the aircraft will
likely be a sure loss. Framing bias could influence
participants to make the riskier decision (in this study’s
scenario) of gliding down to a forced landing even without
much distance between the ground and cloud ceiling (400
feet), instead of choosing the parachute deployment, which
would be a sure loss situation but safer. Supporting
statements of this analysis are found from participants in
Categories 2 and 3 of the results section. If participants are
not aware of this bias, it could subconsciously delay or

33

prevent taking the correct action. For reasons such as these,
Casner (2010) and Dismukes (2010) both advocate for the
enhancement of pilot education on decision making and
decision-making biases. The goal of this type of education
would be to teach pilots how bias influences their decisions
and assist them in recognizing and reducing the negative
impact of biases. Additionally, guidelines and policies may
assist pilots in responding appropriately to situations,
thereby reducing the effect of framing bias.
Training may also play a role in assisting those
participants from Category 4 who forgot about using the
parachute. Study participants highlighted the need for
making a decision or for waiting too long to make the
deployment decision. It is possible that greater knowledge,
training, and standardization may help participants establish clearer guidelines on when to use the CAPS system and
more information to make the most appropriate decision.
It appears that the results of the study were also
inconsistent across the sample. Some participants seemed
to have a clear understanding of parachute usage scenarios
while others were less clear. The inconsistency of
participant responses may suggest the need for a more
formalized training program to ensure consistency in both
awareness and understanding of when and how to use a
safety feature such as an airframe parachute system.
Despite the subject university operating the aircraft for
approximately three years at the time of the study, it may be
inaccurate to assume that all members of the population
have adapted to having an airframe parachute installed in
the aircraft.
Conclusions, Limitations, and Recommendations
The purpose of this study was to complete a qualitative
analysis of the decision-making process used by pilots to
determine whether or not to deploy an airframe parachute
system. A limitation to the present study was the small
sample size, which limits the generalizability of these
findings, along with all participants only being from one
university. Additional research should be completed to
verify the accuracy of these findings and determine if the
inconsistency in deployment scenarios exists across other
populations. A larger scale survey of participants may
provide greater insight into understanding pilot decision
making as it relates to a parachute deployment along with
verifying the findings of the present study.
A finding of concern was the discrepancy between
participants’ response to the engine failure and the opinion
of the expert panel as to the most appropriate outcome: a
deployment of the airframe parachute system. Additionally,
only 33% of participants who did use the parachute system
followed the correct procedure for its deployment. Further
research is necessary to investigate the causal factors of this
discrepancy between experts and participants. While the
university has had aircraft with parachute systems for
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approximately three years, perhaps awareness and education on how and when to make the decision to use this
device have been inconsistent. It may be a false assumption
that just because a new piece of equipment is being utilized,
those operating it will automatically gain awareness on
when and how to use all safety features.
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